

### **Practice:**

Implement a positive feedback system for reporting, documenting, collecting, analyzing, and closing orbital anomaly information on spacecraft. An example of such a system is currently managed by Goddard Space Flight Center.

#### **Benefit:**

Provides a single uniform, effective, and efficient computer data base for in-orbit reliability studies to identify performance trends for use in design reviews, flight readiness reviews, and in the evaluation of test, reliability, and quality assurance policies.

#### **Programs That Certify Usage**

Sampex, COBE instruments and electronic boxes, ISTP instruments, etc.

#### **Center To Contact for More Information:**

Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)

## **Implementation Method:**

Anomaly Reporting - Immediately after the occurrence of an anomaly, the orbiting spacecraft's control center initiates the procedure shown on the SOAR Flow Diagram, Figure 1, by notifying the cognizant Project Operations Director (POD) or other cognizant NASA/government representative. The originator then enters all known information onto a SOAR reporting form (GSFC Form 4-29), Figure 2 and sends it to the POD. The POD assigns a person to be responsible for determining the cause of the anomaly, corrective actions to be taken, etc. The responsible person conducts an anomaly investigation and analysis with the help, as required, of control center personnel, the system or instrument representative, the system integration contractor, the subsystem fabricator, and the Flight Assurance Manager (FAM) or the SOAR

System Manager. The cause of the anomaly is determined, if possible, and corrective action is proposed, agreed to and approved by project and Center management, as appropriate. This information is entered onto the SOAR form by the responsible person. The FAM or SOAR System Manager assures that the agreed-to corrective action indicated on the SOAR

GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A departure from normal operation. An abnormality in the mission operations of a spacecraft (in orbit).

form takes place. When all the SOAR corrective actions have been completed, the FAM or SOAR System Manager is responsible for entering the information onto the SOAR reporting form and closing out the SOAR. The completed SOAR form is distributed to the appropriate project, Flight Assurance, and other interested personnel by the SOAR System Manager. The SOAR System Manager enters information from the SOAR report into the SOAR computer data base and distributes a printout.

Yearly Summary Reports - These reports present a summary of the in-orbit reliability and performance of active spacecraft built under the management of the Goddard Space Flight Center and collectively form a continuous, published record of this performance. These reports provide a variety of statistical summaries including the total number of anomalies, the number of spacecraft over which the anomalies were distributed and a comparison with the anomalies of the previous year. A brief discussion is included of the condition and performance of each active spacecraft. The yearly SOAR reports contain a complete list of all anomalies that occurred during the year, with the subsystem identified that caused each anomaly, the criticality, effect, and a description of the anomaly, and any corrective action that was taken. In addition, graphics show the distribution of anomalies among spacecraft and subsystems and comparisons of levels of criticality, effects, failure categories, and types of anomalies. Anomalies are classified and described in these summaries, lists, graphics, etc. as shown below. These classification categories are defined on the SOAR Form along with instructions for their use.

Subsystems - The spacecraft is divided into the following nine subsystems:

Attitude Control & Stabilization     Power     Propulsion	<ul><li>6. Thermal</li><li>7. Timing, Control &amp; Command</li><li>8. Instrument (Payload)</li></ul>
4. Structure	9. Other
5. Telemetry & Data Handling	

Mission Effect (Criticality) - The following schedule describes the impact of the anomaly on the mission:

1. Negligible	0 - 5% loss
2. Non-negligible but Small (minor)	5 - 33%
3. 1/3 - 2/3 Mission Loss (Substantial)	33 - 66%
4. 2/3 to Nearly Total Loss (Major)	66 - 95%
5. Essentially Total Loss (Catastrophic)	95 - 100%

## Anomaly Effect -

1. Spacecraft Failed	6. Subsystem/Instrument Degraded
2. Subsystem/Instrument Failed	7. Indeterminate
3. Component Failed	8. Loss of Redundancy
4. Assembly Failed	9. None
5. Part Failed	

#### Failure Category -

1. Design Problem	4. Environmental Problem	
2. Workmanship Problem	5. Other (w/explanation)	
3. Part Problem	6. Unknown	

## Type of Anomaly-

Systematic (would occur if identical equipment were	3. Wearout (a special case of systematic)	
operated under identical	4. Indeterminate	
circumstances)	5. Intermittent	
2. Random		

An appendix of the yearly SOAR report also presents a table of spacecraft lifetime data. Table 1. is a sample sheet of spacecraft lifetime data from a yearly SOAR report.

#### **Technical Rationale:**

The SOAR System provides a positive feedback system for reporting, documenting, collecting, analyzing, and closing orbital anomaly information. The timely recognition and analysis of anomalies can lead to corrective measures that can restore performance and, in some cases, protect the safety of the spacecraft and its payload instruments.

The yearly SOAR reports provide GSFC management, spacecraft projects and designers, as well as flight assurance personnel with both short term and long term in-orbit performance and reliability trends which can indicate areas where design improvements should be made on follow-on spacecraft programs. They also can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the prelaunch integration and environmental test programs.

## **Impact of Nonpractice:**

If the practice is not followed, in-orbit anomalies may not be recognized, analyzed, and possibly corrected in a timely manner leading to continued degraded performance and possible damage to the spacecraft. Additionally, deficiencies in designs may not be recognized and corrected in new or follow-on flight missions.

#### **References:**

- 1. Procedure for the Spacecraft Orbital Anomaly Report (SOAR) System GSFC Report No. 303-PROC-013 (Rev C)
- 2. Individual Yearly Reports --- "Orbital Anomalies In Goddard Spacecraft"




Figure 1: SOAR FLOW DIAGRAM

#### **GSFC SPACECRAFT ORBITAL ANOMALY REPORT (SOAR)**

Section 1. (To be completed by originator)

SOAR

1A. PROJECT NO. (OPTIONAL)

No. B-0142

2. SPACECRAFT 3. SUB-SYSTEM OR INSTRUMENT 4. ANOMALY DATE GMT JDAY 5. COMPONENT Name Code ID Number Serial# Manufacturer 6. ASSEMBLY ID Number Name Serial # Manufacturer 7A. REV. NO. 7B. LAT. 7C. LONG. 7D. A/D 7E. S/D 7F. LOCAL TIME 8. DAYS OPERATION (Since Launch) 9. ANOMALY DESCRIPTION: 10. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: 12. NASA/GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE\_ 11. ORIGINATOR SECTION 2. (To be completed by responsible person) 13.CAUSE OF ANOMALY: 14. CORRECTIVE ACTION 15 MISSION EFFECT \_\_\_\_\_\_ 16. ANOMALY EFFECT \_\_\_\_\_\_ 17. FAILURE CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_ 18. TYPE OF ANOMALY \_ 19 ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON FOLLOW-ON S/C 20. REFERENCE DOCUMENT(S) ID: \_ 21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON \_ \_\_\_\_\_\_ 22. NASA/GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE \_\_\_ 23. FAM OR SOAR SYSTEM MGR. \_\_\_\_\_\_ 24. CLOSE-OUT: ENTER CLOSURE DATE \_\_\_\_ **PLEASE PRINT** 

Figure 2. Spacecraft Orbital Anomaly Report (SOAR) Form

GSFC 4-29(2/92)

SPACECRAFT	LAUNCH DATE	DESIGN LIFE (YRS)	USEFUL LIFE (YRS)	ACTIVE LIFE (YRS)	REMARKS
GOES-4(D) GOES-5(E)	9/9/80 5/22/81	7.0	2.21 3.19	6.66	VAS failed 11/25/82 VAS failed 7/30/84. Loss of station-keeping 12/89. Deactivated 7/18/90. Out of estifon-keeping final
NOAA-7(C)	6/23/81	2.0	3.62	4.92	Failed HIRS, degraded SSU, disabled power system.  Mission terminated (carl command S/C) 2/26/91
DE-2(B)	8/3/81	1.0	1.54	1.54	Reentered as expected 2/28/91.
OSS-1	3/22/82	- 2	 ACTIVE		Shuttle attached payload mission.
Landsat-4(D) NOAA-8(E)	3/28/83	2.0	ACIIVE 1.25	ACIIVE 1.25	Fattat Solar Array 1088. Failed 7/1/84. Recovered May 1985. Failed again 1/86.
TDRS-1(A)	4/4/83	* 1	ACTIVE	ACTIVE	Some loss of capability. Orbital spare in early 89.
GOES-6(F)	4/28/83 3/1/84	3.0	5./3 ACTIVE	ACTIVE ACTIVE	VAS failed 1/21/89.
A MPTF/CCF	8/16/84	1.0	4.92	4.92	Some Solar Array degradation. Mission terminated 7/14/89.
ERBS	10/5/84	2.0	ACTIVE	ACTIVE	IRU-1/X-gyro-failed (8/86). IRU-2/Y-gyro failed (7/88). IRU-1/Y-gyro failed (11/89). FRRF-S failed (2/90). IRI1-2/X-ovro failed (7/90).
NOA A GOT	12/12/84	2.0	3.92	ACTIVE	MSU & ERBE-S failure. Placed in standby 11/8/88.
CDADTAN 1	6/20/85	1	:	;	STS attached payload mission.
SPOC/HITCH-	1/12/86	1	1	1	STS attached payload mission.
HIKER NOAA-10(G)	9/17/86	2.0	ACTIVE	ACTIVE	Array shunts degraded. ERBE-S & SARP failed.
GOES-7(H)	2/26/87 9/24/88	7.0	ACTIVE	ACTIVE	V-avro & DTR S A & B failed in late 1989
NOAA-11(H)	9/29/88	*	ACTIVE	ACTIVE	
TDRS-3(C)	3/1/89	*	ACTIVE	ACTIVE	
TDRS-4(D)	11/18/89	0.83	ACTIVE	ACTIVE	Gyro failed.
COBE	4/5/90	0.25	0.75	0.75	PEGASUS. Limited life mission.
PEGSAT	4/24/90	15**	ACTIVE	ACTIVE	Spherical aberration in primary mirror.
HST	10/9/01	ı	;	:	STS attached payload mission.
SSBUV	12/2/90	ı	:	1	STS attached payload mission.
INVGG					

TABLE 1: SAMPLE SHEET OF SPACECRAFT ANOMALY LIFETIME DATA

<u>Useful Life</u> refers to the time during which the major mission objectives were met.

Active Life is the total lifetime during which the satellite remained in service.